By Shawn W Crispin
Asia Times
September 7, 2007
BANGKOK - Political parties are gearing up for general elections in December that promise to usher Thailand back from military to democratic rule. But a highly anticipated military reshuffle, including most crucially the promotion of a new army commander-in-chief, could have a more profound effect on Thailand's political future course than the upcoming polls.
With a new constitution that empowers political appointees who are likely to be influenced by the military over elected politicians, and impending new national-security legislation that, among other anti-democratic provisions, will give the military legal protection in the event of future coups, Thailand's next army commander will, in the name of upholding national security, have significant discretionary authority over politics.
To what degree the Thai military actually exercises those broad new powers will be largely determined by who of three distinctly different career soldiers is elevated next week to the army's top spot. Assistant army chiefs General Saprang Kalayanamitr and General Anupong Paochinda and army chief of staff Lieutenant-General Montri Sangkhasap are viewed as the top contenders for the post, which will be vacated this month when incumbent commander and Council for National Security (CNS) chief General Sonthi Boonyaratklin takes mandatory retirement.
Saprang and Anupong - both ranking CNS members and crucial commanders during last year's military coup that toppled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra - had until recently been viewed as the front-runners, with the policy and planning expert Montri considered a step behind in the race. The two CNS officials have since the coup been locked in a subtle competition for the promotion, and the behind-the-scenes contest has intensified in the run-up to the announcement.
Saprang, 59, would be eligible to serve as commander for just one year before according to military protocol he must retire, while the younger Anupong and Montri could hold the post respectively for three and two years. Some military watchers contend that with the impending transition from military to democratic rule, where the army's role will still be crucial to political stability, elevating a commander who would be a lame duck after only six months would be a potentially destabilizing course.
"If the army is going to take a full step into politics, then it will be Saprang. If only a half-step, then Anupong. And if it intends to beat a full retreat or take one step back, it will be Montri," said Panitan Wattanayagorn, a military scholar at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University and a personal adviser to Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont.
Perceptible cracks in army unity, some military-watchers maintain, could provide a political opening for the exiled Thaksin and his in-country political proxies in the new People's Power Party to play divide-and-rule politics inside the institution and potentially open parliamentary debate about the legality of last year's coup. Defense Minister Boonrawd Somtas hinted last week that the internal jockeying for the post is already affecting political stability.
His comments came hot on the heels of rumors that Saprang - who was quoted in the local press saying that he was unwilling to work under a less senior officer, meaning Anupong or Montri, after the next reshuffle - might attempt to launch a counter-coup if he is overlooked for the post or kicked upstairs to the less powerful ceremonial position of supreme commander. (Saprang has since publicly denied the rumors.)
Competing visions
The internal power struggle has exposed long-brewing rifts pitting hardline versus moderate factions inside the CNS and highlighted their competing visions for the military's future political role.
The hardline camp represented by Saprang believes that the CNS-appointed interim government and its investigative committees have moved too slowly and timidly in prosecuting Thaksin, his family members, and political associates - despite the recent arrest warrants issued for the ex-premier and the court-ordered dissolution in May of his Thai Rak Thai political party. To guard against possible opposition-led probes in the next democratically elected government, the hardline camp, and Saprang in particular, is believed to favor a sustained military involvement in day-to-day politics.
The moderates have so far trumped the hardliners. Apart from prosecuting Thaksin, the interim government led by former army commander and privy councilor Surayud has mainly handled with kid gloves the ex-premier's followers and anti-junta demonstrators - though it's unclear that his tack has achieved the military's stated goal of national reconciliation.
Saprang and his coup-maker ally, Prasong Soonsiri, a former spy chief who now heads the military-appointed National Legislative Assembly, have both recently criticized Surayud's administration for failing sufficiently to weed out Thaksin's influence in the bureaucracy and military and achieve the coup-makers' stated initial aims. It's unclear - but potentially significant for future stability - whether the two powerful hardline figures suspect that Anupong may harbor latent loyalties to Thaksin through their association as pre-cadet academy Class 10 schoolmates.
Divisive reshuffles have over the course of Thailand's military history frequently caused political ripples. Military experts note that the stakes are especially high for the impending rotation after
last year's coup and the military's pledge to return to the barracks after new democratic elections. Politically rather than seniority-motivated promotions orchestrated by former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan were a major factor behind the 1991 military coup that ousted his democratically elected government.
Thaksin paved the way for his own military ouster through a series of controversial rotations that leapfrogged his Class 10 associates
over more senior-ranking officers. Last year's coup came against the backdrop of a similarly contested scheduled reshuffle, in which Thaksin had controversially vied to elevate a clutch of his Class 10 loyalists to the pivotal units.
That would have crucially given the embattled premier an unbroken chain of command over crack troops responsible for Bangkok's security at a time anti-government protests were rocking his administration. That particular reshuffle list reportedly brought Thaksin into direct conflict with senior members of the top brass and Privy Council, and his refusal to back down from the proposed personnel changes appears to have been a major factor behind last year's coup.
New complications
The impending reshuffle, this time driven solely by the CNS and Privy Council, is being complicated in new ways. The three career soldiers now vying for the army's top spot are all cut from distinctly different cloths.
Saprang, glorified in certain Thai media outlets, including the Manager Media Group that owns this website, for his tough talk and dashing good looks, is by all accounts the CNS's designated maverick. Since the coup, he has publicly challenged and on occasion crudely threatened anti-junta and pro-Thaksin groups that have protested against military rule.
At the same time, his critics claim he has besmirched the CNS's corruption-fighting credentials by appointing himself chairman of two big state-owned enterprises, the Airports Authority of Thailand and Telephone Organization of Thailand. He came under heavy media fire for revelations that the TOT had made a secret 800 million baht (US$25 million) "donation" to the army for undisclosed reasons of national security.
The telephone enterprise's union had called for Saprang's dismissal for alleged mismanagement, and the general stepped down ahead of schedule from both agencies' boards this week as what he referred to as a "matter of etiquette".
By contrast, Anupong has maintained a lower public profile and is considered the more politically savvy of the two senior officers. Rather than forming alliances with influential media groups to do his bidding, Anupong has from behind the scenes drummed up support for his candidacy. Military insiders say he is so tight-lipped on crucial issues, including the military's future role in politics, that his personal views are often unknown.
As a Class 10 officer, he was widely viewed as a Thaksin loyalist up until the night of the coup - when he joined in lockstep with the other coup makers and famously failed to return the ousted premier's frantic calls from New York as the plot unfolded. He has since been instrumental in watching for pockets of pro-Thaksin resistance inside the armed forces and was key in making personnel decisions in last year's lightning reshuffle that rotated scores of his Class 10 mates out of command positions.
Anupong rose to prominence as an on-the-ground soldier, and his consensual style of management has reportedly won him widespread respect among the army's rank and file. He also served as commander of Queen Sirikit's 21st Regiment Guard, and his exemplary performance in the position has reportedly put him in the palace's good graces - always a crucial credential for assuming the army's leadership.
Montri, meanwhile, has risen through his performance in policy and planning positions and is widely viewed as a clear-headed military reformer. He is known to be especially close to outgoing commander Sonthi, who after the coup put him in charge of revamping the Internal Security Operations Command, which since the coup has functioned as a sort of shadow government and will continue to do so in the transition toward democracy through the unit's power to appoint deputy governors to every province.
The current commanders of the 1st, 3rd and 4th divisions all hail from Montri's Class 9, which during Thaksin's tenure put a check on rival Class 10 officers. Military insiders say he lacks Anupong's cut-and-thrust political sophistication and rank-and-file support and is seen as less ambitious than the hard-driving Saprang.
Whether the top brass and Privy Council members deciding the reshuffle consider Montri a compromise candidate who could both bridge Anupong's and Saprang's competitive camps and work constructively with the next elected government is still a wild card. "The three cannot be divided," said military expert Panitan. "They must join forces to keep Thaksin from returning. That's very crucial."
Indeed, the final decision will be a reflection of how confident Sonthi and his CNS advisers are that the military has after one year in power successfully consolidated its future political role and protection from prosecution through new laws and legislation and through various court actions hobbled Thaksin's ability to make a political comeback. It is also the first of many crucial appointments that the military and its proxies will make in deciding the course and composition of Thailand's new era of managed democracy.
Shawn W Crispin is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor. He may be reached at swcrispin@atimes.com.
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